The Limits of National Liberation: Problems of Economic Management in the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, With a Statistical Appendix by Adam Fforde & Suzanne H Paine

Author:Adam Fforde & Suzanne H Paine [Fforde, Adam & Paine, Suzanne H]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: Political Science, General
ISBN: 9781000504637
Google: fJZOEAAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 59858116
Publisher: Routledge
Published: 2021-12-28T00:00:00+00:00

Acquisition and use of current inputs

The neo-Stalinist model bases itself upon a reasonably effective control of the distribution of current inputs to production. For the DRY's economic planners, proper resource allocation depended in theory upon the use of technical-economic norms giving the simple arithmetic ratios between planned output levels and the corresponding input requirements of the production unit. Thus planners should have been able to construct aggregate material balances between the supply and use of each major category of resource, permitting them to plan directly the production and distribution of resources needed to meet the given aggregate output targets. Pressure both for less inefficient (i.e. more intensive) resource use and for additional resource mobilisation was to come from the setting of progressive (tien tien) norms, which required extra effort at the micro level if plan targets were to be attained. This was a vital source of increased labour productivity and better resource use within the system. In practice, the low levels of capacity utilisation and generalised inputs shortage meant that this mechanism could not operate at all effectively.

The proportion of current inputs available to the DRY economy that was actually under the direct and unified control of the state trading and distribution network varied throughout the period (13.). During US bombing sad immediately afterwards high levels of aid imports helped prop up the authorities' position against the growing pressure from spreading non-planned activities. There were two major criticisms of the methods used to allocate available supplies. These were, first, that planning was poorly managed, so that supplies were not sent where they were most needed. This reflected particularist pressures from 'Head' Ministries and other organs. Second, the management of the state's system of materials supply was weak - in other words, that materials were both wasted and siphoned-off illegally onto the free market [EPU 1975:205].

The central state system in any case only formally covered a limited number of products. Many other items not produced by the state were in effect managed by the Ministries or provinces 'subject to the operations of the Ministry of Internal Trade in its attempts to control prices and markets'. In the absence of clear guidelines and precise stipulation as to the products covered this led to considerable confusion. Enterprises could - and did - establish direct relations with non-state suppliers or even somewhat autonomous elements within the state distribution system in order to acquire non-listed goods [id.:208]. The way in which the centralising principles of the unified neo-Stalinist model became muddied is brought home by the observation that by the mid 1970s many - if not most - of the State Planning Commission's rights in the allocation of materials had been delegated (uy nhiem) to organs specialised by product type that operated comparatively independently, such as the Petrol Department [id.:211].

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